
Compliance
ISMS ISO/IEC 27001: The Management System Before Annex A
ISO/IEC 27001 certification rests on clauses 4 to 10, not on the Annex A list. Run them as one loop: risk register, SoA, review and corrective action.
Most pages that rank for this question walk the clauses one at a time, as a glossary. That misses the point: each clause's output is another clause's input. Context feeds risk criteria, criteria score the register, the register produces the Statement of Applicability (SoA), measurement and audit feed the management review, and the review's decisions come back as changes.
This article follows that feed through the 2022 edition and gives each link a concrete artefact a platform team can keep in git. ISO texts are paywalled, so clause wording below is quoted as reproduced by High Table, a named secondary source.
The ISMS Is Clauses 4 to 10; Annex A Is a Reference List
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 is the third edition, published in October 2022 by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, nineteen pages long, with one amendment. The certification body Amtivo describes it as two parts: a mandatory "Management" or "ISMS" component, clauses 4 to 10, which it calls "the core requirements that every organisation must follow", and Annex A, which it says contains ninety-three potential controls. The certification body DQS describes Annex A as a normative list of possible controls derived from ISO/IEC 27002:2022.
Clause 4.4 states the job, as reproduced by High Table: "The organisation shall establish, implement, maintain and continually improve an information security management system, including the processes needed and their interactions". The interactions are the part glossaries skip.
Where Annex A enters is clause 6.1.3. The organisation first determines "all controls that are necessary to implement the information security risk treatment option(s) chosen", then must "compare the controls determined with those in Annex A and verify that no necessary controls have been omitted" (High Table, 6.1.3). This article's reading of that order: Annex A is a checklist you run your answer against, not the question. Start from the ninety-three controls and work backwards, and the SoA's rows trace to no risk. The controls themselves, and how a self-hosted platform evidences them, are covered in Annex A you operate.
Context and Leadership: 4.1, 4.2 and Clause 5 as Inputs, Not Preamble
Clause 4.1, as reproduced by High Table, requires the organisation to "determine external issues and internal issues that are relevant to its purpose and that affect its ability to achieve the intended outcome(s)" of the ISMS. Clause 4.2 asks for the relevant interested parties, their relevant information-security requirements, and, in its 2022 form, "c) which of these requirements will be addressed through the information security management system" (High Table, 4.2).
Kept as data rather than narrative, in a file such as isms/context.yaml, each issue and each requirement gets an id, and each requirement carries an addressed_by_isms field answering 4.2 c). A customer contract demanding EU data residency, a regulator's incident-reporting deadline and a single-region dependency are then rows the risk criteria and the register can cite by id. A changed row becomes a 9.3.2 input.
The 2022 edition has one amendment, Amd 1:2024 "Climate action changes": one page, published February 2024, listed at CHF 0 on ISO's own page. As reproduced by High Table, it adds a sentence to 4.1: "The organisation shall determine whether climate change is a relevant issue." It also adds a note to 4.2 saying relevant interested parties can have climate-related requirements. That note is informative, not a requirement. The shall is met by a determination either way. A climate row in the context file, with a decision and a reason, is a house convention for evidencing it, not a 4.1 documented-information requirement.
Clause 5 puts top management on the hook for the system: the policy, the roles and the commitment. In this loop leadership is not a signature page; a sensible convention is to make a named executive the required approver on any pull request that changes the risk criteria or the acceptance threshold.
6.1.2 and 6.1.3: The Risk Register Is the Spine
Clause 6.1.2, as reproduced by High Table, requires "information security risk criteria that include: the risk acceptance criteria; and criteria for performing information security risk assessments", and a process that "ensures that repeated information security risk assessments produce consistent, valid and comparable results". The process must identify risk owners, assess consequences and "the realistic likelihood" to "determine the levels of risk", then compare results with the criteria and prioritise for treatment. Documented information about the process must be retained.
"Consistent, valid and comparable" is a reproducibility requirement, and the simplest way to meet it is to make the criteria machine-readable and the level a computed value. Clause 6.1.3 then adds the treatment steps: determine the necessary controls, compare with Annex A, produce the SoA, "formulate an information security risk treatment plan; and obtain risk owners' approval of the information security risk treatment plan and acceptance of the residual information security risks". Below is the register for a fictional platform team, as a house convention rather than a format the standard prescribes:
# isms/risk-register.yaml: a fictional platform team's register (house convention)
criteria: # 6.1.2: the scales every assessment uses
likelihood: {1: rare, 2: possible, 3: likely, 4: almost certain}
impact: {1: minor, 2: moderate, 3: major, 4: severe}
method: level = likelihood x impact
acceptance_threshold: 6 # residual above this needs owner acceptance
risks:
- id: R-007
title: etcd snapshot copied out of the backup bucket
asset: etcd snapshots (cluster state, including Secrets)
owner: head-of-platform
cia: [confidentiality]
likelihood: 3
impact: 4
level: 12
treatment: modify
controls: ["8.13", "8.24", "5.15"]
residual: {likelihood: 1, impact: 4, level: 4}
acceptance: {by: head-of-platform, date: 2026-11-02}
next_review: 2027-05-01
- id: R-014
title: node OS left unpatched after a vendor fix ships
asset: Talos and worker node images
owner: platform-lead
cia: [confidentiality, integrity, availability]
likelihood: 3
impact: 4
level: 12
treatment: modify
controls: ["8.8", "8.9"]
residual: {likelihood: 2, impact: 4, level: 8}
acceptance: {by: platform-lead, date: 2026-11-02}
next_review: 2027-02-01
R-014's residual level of 8 sits above the threshold, so it ships only with the owner's dated acceptance: that line is the 6.1.3 residual-risk acceptance, in the same commit as the score it accepts. The SoA's required contents (the necessary controls, justification for inclusion, implementation status, and justification for each excluded Annex A control) are covered in ISO 27002 vs 27001; its soa.yaml layout is the one in the Annex A article.
Checking the Risk Register Against 6.1.2 and 6.1.3
A register in git is only as good as what stops a bad commit. This script validates the register itself. It reads soa.yaml read-only, to confirm that every included control traces to at least one risk. It does not generate an SoA, and it does not check the SoA against running systems; that fail-closed reconciliation is reconcile_soa.py in the ISO 27002 article.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Check isms/risk-register.yaml against 6.1.2, 6.1.3 and 8.2.
Needs PyYAML (third-party: pip install pyyaml); everything else is stdlib.
Reads soa.yaml read-only and only to trace included controls to risks.
Usage: check_register.py [risk-register.yaml] [soa.yaml] Exit 1 on findings.
"""
import datetime
import sys
import yaml
TREATMENTS = {"modify", "retain", "avoid", "share"}
def check(register, soa, today):
crit = register["criteria"]
limit = crit["acceptance_threshold"]
found, covered = [], set()
def scored(rid, part, entry):
lk, im = entry.get("likelihood"), entry.get("impact")
if lk not in crit["likelihood"] or im not in crit["impact"]:
found.append(f"{rid}: {part} likelihood/impact outside the 6.1.2 scales")
return None
if entry.get("level") != lk * im:
found.append(f"{rid}: {part} level {entry.get('level')}, criteria give {lk * im}")
return lk * im
for risk in register["risks"]:
rid = risk.get("id", "<no id>")
if not risk.get("owner"):
found.append(f"{rid}: no risk owner (6.1.2)")
scored(rid, "inherent", risk)
if risk.get("treatment") not in TREATMENTS:
found.append(f"{rid}: no valid treatment option (6.1.3)")
covered.update(risk.get("controls", []))
residual = scored(rid, "residual", risk.get("residual") or {})
accepted = risk.get("acceptance") or {}
if residual and residual > limit and not (accepted.get("by") and accepted.get("date")):
found.append(f"{rid}: residual {residual} > {limit} with no owner acceptance and date")
due = risk.get("next_review")
if not isinstance(due, datetime.date) or due < today:
found.append(f"{rid}: next_review {due} missing or past (8.2)")
for row in soa:
if row.get("decision") == "included" and str(row["control"]) not in covered:
found.append(f"SoA {row['control']}: included, but no register risk maps to it")
return found
def main(argv):
reg_path = argv[1] if len(argv) > 1 else "isms/risk-register.yaml"
soa_path = argv[2] if len(argv) > 2 else "isms/soa.yaml"
with open(reg_path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
register = yaml.safe_load(f)
with open(soa_path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
soa = yaml.safe_load(f)
findings = check(register, soa, datetime.date.today())
for line in findings:
print(line)
print(f"{len(findings)} finding(s) in {reg_path}")
return 1 if findings else 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main(sys.argv))
The treatment vocabulary is the register's own, not the standard's. Wire it into CI on every change under isms/, and on a weekly schedule too, because a review date passes without anyone committing anything:
name: isms-register
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- "isms/**"
schedule:
- cron: "0 6 * * 1"
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
check-register:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- run: pip install pyyaml==6.0.2
- run: python isms/check_register.py isms/risk-register.yaml isms/soa.yaml
6.2, 6.3 and Clause 8: Objectives, Planned Change and Reassessment
Clause 6.2, as reproduced by High Table, requires objectives that are consistent with the policy, "measurable (if practicable)", that "take into account applicable information security requirements, and risk assessment and risk treatment results", and that are monitored, communicated, updated, and available as documented information. Planning must fix "h) what will be done; i) what resources will be required; j) who will be responsible; k) when it will be completed; and l) how the results will be evaluated." Five fields per objective is an issue template, not a policy paragraph.
Clause 6.3 is new in the 2022 edition. It is the shared planning-of-changes clause, which is why DQS calls the requirement familiar from other management systems. As reproduced by High Table, it requires that when the organisation determines the need for changes to the ISMS, "the changes shall be carried out in a planned manner." A reviewed pull request against the ISMS repository is a planned change with its record attached.
Clause 8 is where the plan runs. Clause 8.1, as reproduced by High Table, asks for documented information "to the extent necessary to have confidence that the processes have been carried out as planned", control of planned changes, and control of relevant externally provided processes, products or services. Clause 8.2 requires risk assessments "at planned intervals or when significant changes are proposed or occur, taking account of the criteria established in 6.1.2 a)", with results retained (High Table, 8.2). The planned interval is next_review, which the CI job enforces. The significant change needs a trigger: a CODEOWNERS rule or a required risk-review label on infrastructure pull requests touching in-scope systems, so the register owner sees it before merge. Clause 8.3 implements the treatment plan and retains its results.
9.1 and 9.3: Measurement That Feeds a Management Review
Clause 9.1, as reproduced by High Table, requires the organisation to determine "a) what needs to be monitored and measured", "b) the methods", "c) when", "d) who shall monitor and measure", "e) when the results ... shall be analysed and evaluated" and "f) who shall analyse and evaluate these results". The same reproduction adds that the methods "should produce comparable and reproducible results to be considered valid", and that the organisation "shall evaluate the information security performance and effectiveness" of the ISMS. So every metric should come from a query or an export, not a hand count, and carry all six fields:
- Critical node CVEs past target window. Method: scanner export by severity and age. Measured weekly by CI; analysed monthly by the platform lead.
- Register findings. Method:
check_register.pyoutput count from the scheduled run. Measured weekly; analysed at each management review by the ISMS owner. - Open corrective actions past their effectiveness date. Method: issue-tracker query on the
nonconformitylabel. Measured on demand; analysed quarterly by the ISMS owner.
Clause 9.3.1 requires top management to review the ISMS "at planned intervals to ensure its continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness". The 2022 edition splits 9.3 into 9.3.1, 9.3.2 and 9.3.3, as DQS notes. Clause 9.3.2, as reproduced by High Table, lists the inputs, and each has a tracked source in this loop. Clause 9.3.3 requires results that "include decisions related to continual improvement opportunities and any needs for changes" to the ISMS, with documented evidence. The record below is a template excerpt; the placeholders are filled from queries:
# Management review <DATE> (attendees: <TOP-MANAGEMENT NAMES>)
## a) Status of actions from previous management reviews
<QUERY: label:mgmt-review-action, opened before this review>
## b) Changes in external and internal issues
<git diff <LAST-REVIEW-TAG> -- isms/context.yaml (issues)>
## c) Changes in needs and expectations of interested parties
<same diff, interested-party rows>
## d) Feedback on the information security performance, including trends in
1) Nonconformities and corrective actions: <QUERY: label:nonconformity>
2) Monitoring and measurement results: <9.1 TABLE EXPORTS>
3) Audit results: <INTERNAL AUDIT FINDINGS>
4) Fulfilment of information security objectives: <6.2 OBJECTIVE ISSUES>
## e) Feedback from interested parties
<FEEDBACK LOG ENTRIES>
## f) Results of risk assessment and status of risk treatment plan
<git diff <LAST-REVIEW-TAG> -- isms/risk-register.yaml; check_register.py output>
## g) Opportunities for continual improvement
<LIST>
## 9.3.3 Decisions
| Decision | Change to the ISMS? | Owner | Issue |
|----------|---------------------|-------|-------|
| <DECISION> | <yes/no> | <OWNER> | <ISSUE LINK, label:mgmt-review-action> |
Tag the repository at each review: the next review's a) input is a query against issues from this decision table, and b), c) and f) are diffs since the tag. The internal audit results in d) 3) come from the 9.2 programme described in ISO 27001 audits, which also explains why certification and surveillance auditors read this record.
Clause 10: Corrective Action as Tracked Work With an Effectiveness Check
Clause 10.1, as reproduced by High Table, requires the organisation to "continually improve the suitability, adequacy and effectiveness" of the ISMS. For 10.2, High Table's own summary of the steps is: control and correct the nonconformity, deal with the consequences, review it, determine its causes and whether similar nonconformities exist or could occur, implement the action needed, review the effectiveness of the corrective action, change the ISMS if necessary, and keep evidence for audit.
Two distinctions get lost in a ticket queue. Correction is containment: restore the missed backup, revoke the stale credential. Corrective action removes the cause. And the similar-nonconformities step is a search, not a sentence: query the tracker for the same failure mode and grep the register for risks whose controls share the failed mechanism. An issue form makes each step a field:
name: Nonconformity (10.2)
description: Record a nonconformity, its correction and its corrective action.
title: "NC: "
labels: ["nonconformity"]
body:
- type: dropdown
id: source
attributes:
label: Source
options:
- Internal audit
- Incident
- Management review
- External audit
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: description
attributes:
label: Nonconformity and evidence
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: correction
attributes:
label: Correction taken (containment)
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: root-cause
attributes:
label: Root cause
- type: textarea
id: similar
attributes:
label: Similar nonconformities checked (queries run, register ids)
- type: textarea
id: corrective-action
attributes:
label: Corrective action (link the ISMS pull request if it changes the ISMS)
- type: input
id: effectiveness-date
attributes:
label: Effectiveness check date (YYYY-MM-DD)
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: effectiveness-method
attributes:
label: Effectiveness check method and result
validations:
required: true
Issue forms validate only when the issue is opened, so root cause and corrective action stay optional at filing. Closure discipline is a convention the review enforces: an issue closed before its effectiveness date, or without a result in the method field, is itself a finding under 9.3.2 d) 1). When the corrective action changes the ISMS, it lands as a pull request against the register or a policy, linked from the issue, so the change is also a 6.3 planned change. Recurring causes across closed nonconformities are the evidence for 10.1.
Where the Register Can Live
Licences of CISO Assistant and eramba are compared in ISO 27001 audits. Three facts matter here. At v4.3.4, CISO Assistant's bundled ISO/IEC 27001:2022 library, which calls itself an outline of the standard, models the clauses as requirement nodes from 4.1 to 10.2, including 6.3 and 9.3.2, not only Annex A. Its API router registers risk-scenarios, applied-controls and risk-acceptances, which is the export path for treatment and acceptance state. SimpleRisk publishes MPL-2.0 source to a read-only mirror, with development in a private repository. Git plus check_register.py remains the baseline any of them should export back to.
Failure Modes, Exit Ramps and the Long Game
- SoA drift from the register. Controls added to the SoA with no risk behind them. The trace check fails the pull request.
- Management review as theatre. A slide deck whose decisions are never seen again. Decisions become issues, and the next review's input a) queries them.
- Corrective actions closed without an effectiveness check. The form requires a date and a method; the review treats an early close as a finding.
- The GRC tool as the only copy. Change tools and the history goes too. Keep files authoritative, the tool a view.
The exit ramp is built in: YAML and Markdown in a repository you own, checked by a script you can read. For how this certificate differs from a SOC 2 opinion, see ISO 27001 vs SOC 2.
§FAQ/Common questions
Frequently asked
What is an ISMS under ISO/IEC 27001?
It is the management system defined by clauses 4 to 10 of ISO/IEC 27001:2022: context, leadership, planning (risk assessment, risk treatment, objectives and planned changes), support, operation, performance evaluation and improvement. Clause 4.4 requires the organisation to establish, implement, maintain and continually improve it, including the processes needed and their interactions.
Is Annex A part of the ISMS requirements?
Annex A is a normative list of possible controls derived from ISO/IEC 27002:2022. Clause 6.1.3 requires you to determine the controls your risk treatment needs, compare them with Annex A to verify none were omitted, and record the result in the Statement of Applicability. The management-system clauses 4 to 10 are the requirements an organisation must meet.
What changed in clauses 4 to 10 in the 2022 edition?
Clause 6.3 Planning of changes is new and requires ISMS changes to be carried out in a planned manner, and clause 9.3 is split into 9.3.1, 9.3.2 and 9.3.3. Amendment 1:2024 adds a requirement to 4.1 to determine whether climate change is a relevant issue, and a note to 4.2 about climate-related requirements of interested parties.
What are the management review inputs in ISO 27001 clause 9.3.2?
As reproduced by High Table: the status of actions from previous reviews; changes in external and internal issues; changes in interested parties' needs and expectations; feedback on performance, including trends in nonconformities and corrective actions, monitoring and measurement results, audit results and fulfilment of objectives; feedback from interested parties; results of risk assessment and status of the risk treatment plan; and opportunities for continual improvement.
Can an ISMS risk register live in git instead of a GRC tool?
Nothing in clauses 4 to 10 prescribes a tool. A versioned YAML register with computed risk levels, owner acceptances and review dates, checked in CI, gives the retained documented information 6.1.2, 6.1.3 and 8.2 ask for, with history. A GRC tool can still serve as an interface if it exports back to files.
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